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We present a scheme for implementing homomorphic encryption on coherent states encoded using
phase-shift keys. The encryption operations require only rotations in phase space, which com-
mute with computations in the codespace performed via passive linear optics, and with generalized
non-linear phase operations that are polynomials of the photon-number operator in the codespace.
This encoding scheme can thus be applied to any computation with coherent state inputs, and the
computation proceeds via a combination of passive linear optics and generalized non-linear phase
operations. An example of such a computation is matrix multiplication, whereby a vector repre-
senting coherent state amplitudes is multiplied by a matrix representing a linear optics network,
yielding a new vector of coherent state amplitudes. By finding an orthogonal partitioning of the
support of our encoded states, we quantify the security of our scheme via the indistinguishability
of the encrypted codewords. Whilst we focus on coherent state encodings, we expect that this
phase-key encoding technique could apply to any continuous-variable computation scheme where
the phase-shift operator commutes with the computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical cryptography, homomorphic encryption
has been a topic of intense interest in recent years [1–
3]. It is a form of encryption that allows a computa-
tion to be performed on the encrypted text without hav-
ing to first decrypt the text. If an arbitrary computa-
tion is allowed, then the encryption is said to be fully
homomorphic. The first fully homomorphic encryption
scheme was only discovered recently by Gentry in 2009
[2]. However, like many other classical cryptographic
primitives, these homomorphic schemes only offer com-
putational security, which means that they are secure as
long as certain problems are computationally intractable.
The search for information-theoretically secure encryp-
tion problems has led to quantum analogues of homomor-
phic encryption [4–6]. These schemes only have to hide
the quantum input to the computation, unlike a related
quantum cryptographic protocol known as blind quan-
tum computation (BQC) [7] which also hides the desired
computation. However, unlike BQC, no interactive pro-
tocols are allowed in quantum homomorphic encryption.
Other schemes that perform quantum computing on en-
crypted data that require interactions are known [8–11],
though confusingly some of them have been labeled as
“quantum homomorphic encryption” [8, 9]. Others have
focused on hybrid schemes [12–14] that bootstrap on a
classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme to achieve
computational security while allowing certain classes of
∗Electronic address: sihui tan@sutd.edu.sg
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quantum computations to be performed on encrypted
data. However, some restrictions have arisen. It has been
shown that efficient quantum fully-homomorphic encryp-
tion is impossible [15, 16], even when relaxing from per-
fect to imperfect security. Nonetheless, the key insights
contributed by the advent of these quantum schemes still
expand the possibilities for implementations of homomor-
phic encryption in various forms and for different uses,
especially since partial information security is still possi-
ble for sets of computations of large cardinality [4, 5].
It was shown in [4] that homomorphic encryption may
be implemented for a restricted class of quantum com-
putation known as the Boson-Sampling model [17–21].
In the Boson-Sampling model, computation is performed
via a passive linear optical network with a subset of the
input modes of this network initialized with a single pho-
ton, and the remainder initialized in the vacuum state.
To implement the homomorphic encryption described in
[4], the client begins by inputting a single-photon into
every mode, as opposed to just a subset of the modes.
Modes where a single photon should have been present
are vertically polarized, whereas modes where no pho-
ton should have been present are horizontally polarized.
Because horizontally and vertically polarized photons
do not interfere, they effectively evolve independently
through the linear optics network, and by discarding all
horizontally polarized photons at the output, the desired
computation is recovered. Security is achieved by ap-
plying the same random polarization rotation to every
photon before entry to the network. The angle of ro-
tation acts as the client’s private key, which is not dis-
closed to the party performing the evaluation. After the
evaluation, the photons are returned to the user, who
subsequently applies the inverse rotation and discards
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
03
96
8v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
11
 O
ct 
20
17
2all horizontally polarized photons, thereby recovering the
computation. However, in the absence of knowledge of
the key, it is difficult to differentiate between photons
that belong to the computation or those which should
be discarded. With this scheme, O(log2(m)) bits can be
hidden when m bits are encrypted. Using group theo-
retical insights, this homomorphic scheme has been ex-
panded upon to enable quantum computation beyond
Boson-Sampling while improving the security [5] to hide
a constant fraction of the number of bits sent. This frac-
tion can be made arbitrarily close to unity by increasing
the number of internal states of the bosons used to en-
code information.
Quantum information theory relies on representing in-
formation using quantum states. The underlying alge-
bra of the states, and hence of the operations forming
the encoding, affect the performance of the encryption
scheme. In this paper, we explore the use of a phase
rotation encoding for coherent-state qubits. The advan-
tages of using coherent states are plentiful. Coherent
states are produced relatively easily; a laser source closely
approximates a coherent state. In phase-space a coher-
ent state is a ‘blob’, where the distance from the ori-
gin is the amplitude of the coherent state and the an-
gle is its phase. Schemes exist to encode classical bits
onto coherent states [22], to create a collection of uni-
versal gate sets for computations with these encodings
[23, 24], and to map general quantum communication
protocols involving pure states of multiple qubits into one
that employs coherent states [25]. The ease of produc-
ing, manipulating and distributing coherent states have
seeded continuous-variable analogues [26], primarily fea-
turing coherent states, of quantum cryptography schemes
such as quantum key distribution [27–29] and random ci-
phers for quantum encryption [30, 31].
In this paper, we present a novel somewhat-
homomorphic encryption scheme that utilizes a logical
encoding onto coherent states, and encrypts with random
rotations in phase space. The scheme works as follows:
each classical bit is represented on a single coherent state.
A random private key is generated, and the same corre-
sponding random phase shift is applied to every coherent
state. An evaluation that is made up of elements from
an allowed set of operations, G, is then performed on the
encrypted data. The set G contains beamsplitters, linear
and non-linear phase-shifts, and unitaries that commute
with encryption operators. Both the Kerr and cross-Kerr
interactions are also included in G. In fact, any operator
that preserves photon number will work.
We quantify the security of our protocol with the trace
distance between any two encrypted inputs. In this no-
tion of security, an adversary without knowledge of the
secret key attempts to distinguish the encryptions of any
two messages. The smaller the trace distance, the more
indistinguishable the encrypted messages are to the ad-
versary. We find this trace distance by showing that
the encoding operation induces a partition structure in
the states of the microcanonical ensemble where most
of the off-diagonal terms are zeroed out. The partition
structure gives a closed-form equation for the trace dis-
tance between two encrypted inputs. By comparing this
trace distance to that for the corresponding unencrypted
state, we show that our encryption scheme suppresses
the distinguishability of the encoded states and thus pro-
vides some security against an adversary attempting to
identify the encoded message. Our scheme demonstrates
that quantum somewhat-homomorphic encryption is pos-
sible for qubit encodings using continuous-variable states.
Whilst we focus on a coherent-state encoding, a simi-
lar phase-key encoding scheme might be applicable to
other continuous-variable (CV) computation schemes. In
principle, this encoding could be applied to any CV
scheme where the phase-shift operator commutes with
the computation, for any choice of basis states that are
not rotation-symmetric in phase-space, such as photon-
number states.
II. LOGICAL ENCODING USING COHERENT
STATES
Consider an encoding of logical qubits using coher-
ent states with |0L〉 = |α〉, and |1L〉 = |−α〉, where
|α〉 = ∑∞n=0 e− |α|22 αn√n! |n〉 with α ∈ C. An m-bit binary
string x := (x1, x2, . . . , xm) is represented by the tensor
product state |ψx〉 = |(−1)x1α〉 |(−1)x2α〉 . . . |(−1)xmα〉.
These logical qubits are not orthogonal as | 〈α| − α〉 |2 =
e−4|α|
2
> 0. Consequently, when m bits are encoded
using the ensemble {px, ρˆx}, where px is the prior prob-
ability for the string x and ρˆx = |ψx〉 〈ψx|, the accessible
information of the ensemble, Iacc({px, ρˆx}), is less than
m bits.
A lower bound on the accessible information of the
encoding ensemble can be obtained for a uniform prior
by the mutual information between x and the outcomes
given by a pretty-good measurement (PGM) [32], yPGM.
The assumption that the prior distribution of the code-
words is uniform corresponds to the case where the
evaluator has no prior information about the source.
The PGM is described by the positive-operator valued
measure (POVM) {ρˆ− 12 ρˆxρˆ− 12 ,x ∈ Zm2 }, where ρˆ =
1
2m
∑
x∈Zm2 ρˆx =
1
2m (ρˆ0 + ρˆ1)
⊗m, ρˆ0 := |α〉 〈α|, and
ρˆ1 := |−α〉 〈−α|. Here ρˆ− 12 denotes the pseudoinverse
of the matrix square root of the density matrix ρˆ.
Every element of the POVM is a tensor product over
the m modes, thus the mutual information for the m-
mode inputs x to outputs yPGM is
I(x;yPGM) = mI(x; yPGM) , (1)
where the I(x; yPGM) is the mutual information for a
single-mode discrimination by the PGM. Let px(`) :=
1
2 and py(j) be the prior and posterior probabilities for
3obtaining x = ` and y = j respectively. Then, we have
I(x; yPGM) =
1∑
j,`=0
px(`)p(j|`) log2
(
p(j|`)
py(j)
)
, (2)
where p(j|`) := tr(Πj |`L〉 〈`L|), and Πj = 2(ρˆ0 +
ρˆ1)
− 12 ρˆxj (ρˆ0 + ρˆ1)
− 12 is the conditional probability that
the jth outcome was measured given that |`L〉 was sent,
and
Πj :=
(
ρˆ0 + ρˆ1
2
)− 12
|(−1)jα〉 〈(−1)jα|
(
ρˆ0 + ρˆ1
2
)− 12
.
(3)
The mixed state 12 (ρˆ0 + ρˆ1) has the spectral decompo-
sition a+ |ψ+〉 〈ψ+| + a− |ψ−〉 〈ψ−| [33] where the eigen-
vectors are
|ψ±〉 := |α〉 ± |−α〉√
2
√
1± exp(−2|α|2) , (4)
with eigenvalues a± := 12 (1 ± exp(−2|α|2)) respectively.
The conditional probabilities are explicitly
p(j|`) =
{
1
2
(√
a+ +
√
a−
)2
, j = `
1
2
(√
a+ −√a−
)2
, j 6= ` ,
(5)
and thus
I(x; yPGM) =(
√
a+ +
√
a−)2 log2(
√
a+ +
√
a−)
+ (
√
a+ −√a−)2 log2(
√
a+ −√a−) . (6)
When |α| → 0, we have I(x; yPGM) = 2|α|2/ ln(2) +
O(|α|4), while if |α| → ∞, I(x; yPGM) → 1. This is
expected because |α〉 and |−α〉 are barely distinguish-
able for small |α|, but become nearly orthogonal as |α|
becomes large.
III. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Here, we define encoding and decoding operations that
encrypt and decrypt the data. We follow the approach
of [5], wherein the encoding operators are chosen to com-
mute with those of the computation in the codespace.
After the classical string is encoded onto coherent-state
qubits, the user chooses a key k uniformly at random
from the set {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, where d is a positive in-
teger. A phase space rotation is then implemented on
every mode, each with the same angle. The phase space
rotation operator on the jth mode is
Φ̂j(θk) = exp(−iθkaˆ†j aˆj) , (7)
where θk := 2pik/d. Such an operation on a coherent
state yields also a coherent state with the same am-
plitude, but rotated in phase space by θk around the
origin. The application of the above operator on every
mode gives a net operator that is generated by the to-
tal photon-number operator, Nˆ :=
∑m
j=1 aˆ
†
j aˆj . The en-
crypted state is then processed before decryption. The
processing is performed by an evaluator, who is able to
process the encrypted state without knowing the secret
key. Finally, the output bit-string y := (y1, y2, . . . , ym)
can be determined by a measurement on the modes after
an inverse rotation Φ̂j(−θk). Since the computation op-
erators are conditioned to commute with the encryption
(and decryption) operators and the decryption algorithm
is constant in the length of the input, our scheme satis-
fies the Broadbent and Jeffery’s condition of correctness
and compactness [12]. In the next section, we will show
that non-trivial computation operators which commute
with
⊗m
j=1 Φ̂(θk) exist. Then, we discuss the complex-
ity of these allowed computations in our scheme. They
are closely linked to Boson-Sampling [17] and quantum
walks [34, 35] – equivalent non-universal models of quan-
tum computation.
IV. ALLOWED COMPUTATIONAL
OPERATIONS
The evaluation of quantum operations on the cipher-
text is implemented via a unitary operator U = e−iHt/~
with its evaluation Hamiltonian H implemented by quan-
tum optical components that are necessarily (Hermitian)
photon-number-preserving operators. Using Ehrenfest’s
Theorem, we have the following evolution of the total
photon-number operator N̂ under a given Hamiltonian
H: d 〈N̂〉 /dt = 1i~ 〈[N̂ ,H]〉. Since the evaluation opera-
tors do not change the photon-number of the input, then
d 〈N̂〉 /dt = 0. This implies that 〈[N̂ ,H]〉 = 0. A set of
photon-number-preserving computations that also com-
mutes with Nˆ includes operations in passive linear optics
(phase shifts and beamsplitters), and operations that are
polynomials of the number operators. We call the latter
set the generalized non-linear phase operations and their
Hamiltonians are of the form
HNL :=
∑
n∈Nm
gn1,...,nm
m∏
k=1
(a†kak)
nk , (8)
where gn1,...,nm is a coupling constant. The single-mode
Kerr and cross-Kerr interactions are special cases of HNL
[36]. Let K be a constant that is proportional to a third-
order nonlinear susceptibility. The single-mode Kerr in-
teraction is given by m = 1, g1 = −~K, g2 = ~K, and
gn1 = 0 otherwise, while the cross-Kerr interaction is
given by m = 2, g1,1 = ~K and gn1,n2 = 0 otherwise.
Passive linear optics is featured heavily in the Boson-
Sampling model, where we begin by preparing n single
photons in m optical modes (see Fig. 1). This input state
evolves via non-adaptive, passive linear optics, which im-
plements a unitary map on the photon creation opera-
tors, aˆ†i →
∑m
j=1 Ui,j aˆ
†
j . The output state to the inter-
4FIG. 1: The Boson-Sampling model. A string of n single
photons is prepared in m optical modes. They are evolved
via a passive interferometer U . Finally the photon-statistics
are sampled from the distribution P (S).
ferometer has the form, |ψout〉 =
∑
S γS |n(S)1 , . . . , n(S)m 〉,
where S represents a photon number configuration with
n
(S)
i photons in the ith mode, and γS are the associ-
ated amplitudes. Finally, coincidence photodetection is
performed, which samples from the probability distri-
bution P (S) = |γS |2. Aaronson and Arkhipov showed
that sampling from P (S) is likely to be a hard prob-
lem for classical computers for some scaling of m with
n [17]. Nonetheless, when the inputs to the circuit
are switched from single photons to coherent states, the
quantum computation performed can be efficiently simu-
lated classically [37], using simple m × m matrix mul-
tiplication. This changes, however, when we also al-
low Kerr interactions in the circuit, because this inter-
action allows the production of cat states from coherent
states [38]. For instance, in the interaction picture where
K(aˆ†aˆ)2 is regarded as the interaction part of the eval-
uation Hamiltonian, an initial coherent state will evolve
to e−i~Kt(aˆ
†aˆ)2 |α〉 = 1√
2
(
e−ipi/4 |α〉+ eipi/4 |−α〉) at time
t = pi2~K . Cat states when evolved via passive linear op-
tics and sampled with number-resolved photodetection
implements a classically hard sampling problem under
plausible complexity theoretic assumptions [39], although
it is not believed to be universal for quantum computa-
tion.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Without knowledge of the key, the encrypted input
state is
E(ρˆx) := 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
m⊗
j=1
Φ̂j
(
2pik
d
)
|ψxj 〉 〈ψxj | Φ̂j
(
−2pik
d
)
=
 m⊗
j=1
V
xj
j
 E(ρˆ0)
 m⊗
j=1
V
†xj
j
 . (9)
where xj is the j-th element of the string x, |ψxj 〉 :=
|(−1)xjα〉 is the state of the jth mode of |ψx〉, and Vj =
Φ̂j(pi). If someone without knowledge of the key were
to attempt to measure the encrypted input state, ρˆx,
they would perceive a state highly mixed in the phase
degree of freedom, and have difficulty in differentiating
between states that belong to the computation. This
indistinguishability gives a security for our scheme which
we now make precise.
To quantify the security of our encryption scheme, we
obtain an upper bound on the trace distance between the
encrypted states given by D(E(ρˆu), E(ρˆv)) for arbitrary
pairs ofm-bit strings u and v, whereD(σ, τ) = 12‖σ−τ‖tr
denotes the trace distance between the density matri-
ces σ and τ . It suffices to obtain an upper bound on
D(E(ρˆx), E(ρˆ0)) where x = u ⊕ v, because using the in-
variance of the trace distance under unitary transforma-
tion we can get to the trace distance between any pairs
of encrypted states.
We first write the phase-shift operator on the Fock
space Φ̂
(
2pi
d
)
:=
∑
y∈N ω
y |y〉 〈y| where ω = e−2pii/d and
N is the set of non-negative integers. Let φ(z) =
∑
i zi
mod d. Now for every integer `, the matrix (Φ̂( 2pid )
⊗m)`
is equivalent to
∑
y∈Nm ω
`φ(y) |y〉 〈y|. Hence, using the
Fourier identity 1d
∑d−1
`=0 ω
`φ(y−z) = δφ(y−z),0,
E(ρˆ0) =
∑
z,y∈Nm
δφ(y−z),0bzb∗y |z〉 〈y| , (10)
where bz = bz1bz2 . . . bzm is a product of complex coeffi-
cients, each given by bn := e
−|α|2/2 αn√
n!
. The state E(ρˆ0)
admits a block diagonal decomposition, with each block
labeled by φ(y− z) = j. The support of the jth block is
{|z〉 ∈ Gj : z ∈ Nm}, where Gj := {z ∈ Nm : φ(z) = j}
is a partition of Nm. Defining |gj〉 :=
∑
z∈Gj bz |z〉, then
E(ρˆ0) =
d−1∑
j=0
qj |g˜j〉 〈g˜j | , (11)
where |g˜j〉 = |gj〉 /√qj is a normalized state and
qj = 〈gj |gj〉 =
∑
z∈Gj
|bz|2 .
This partition structure makes it straightforward to
compute the trace distance between E(ρˆx) and E(ρˆ0).
Using eq. 10 in the expression in eq. 9, we have
E(ρˆx) =
d−1∑
`=0
q` |h˜`〉 〈h˜`| , (12)
where |h˜`〉 is the normalized state
|h˜`〉 =
m⊗
k=1
V xkk |g˜`〉 =
1√
q`
∑
z∈G`
bz(−1)x·z |z〉 . (13)
The states |g˜k〉 and |h˜`〉 satisfies the relationship
〈h˜`|g˜k〉 =
{
Ak if k = `
0 otherwise
, (14)
5FIG. 2: A plot of D(E(ρˆu), E(ρˆv)) versus |α| for m = 10 and
d = 100, and for various values of w = wt(u⊕ v).
FIG. 3: A plot of D(ρˆu, ρˆv) versus |α| for m = 10 and d = 100,
and for various values of w = wt(u⊕ v).
where Ak =
1
qk
∑
z∈Gk |bz|2(−1)x·z and is a real constant.
Owing to the orthogonality of the blocks in the block
decomposition of E(ρˆ0) and E(ρˆx), we can express the
trace distance between them as a sum across blocks. Let
Ôk := |h˜k〉 〈h˜k| + |g˜k〉 〈g˜k| − Ak |h˜k〉 〈g˜k| − Ak |g˜k〉 〈h˜k|.
Then
D(E(ρˆu), E(ρˆv)) = 1
2
d−1∑
k=0
qktr
(√
Ôk
)
=
d−1∑
k=0
qk
√
1−A2k,
(15)
where 1− A2k is the eigenvalue of Oˆk of multiplicity two
(please see Appendix A for derivation).
In the limit d→∞, we can drop the modulus in φ(z)
and use the multinomial theorem to simplify qk and Ak.
We have
qk
d→∞
= e−m|α|
2 (m|α|2)k
k!
, (16)
and
Ak
d→∞
=
1
qk
(m− 2wt(x))ke−m|α|2 |α|
2k
k!
(17)
respectively, where wt(x) is the Hamming weight of x =
u⊕v. Details of the derivation of qk and Ak are given in
Appendix B. If d is finite, the modulus in the definition of
the function φ(x) prevents us from using the multinomial
theorem, and these results would not apply. Explicitly,
we have
D(E(ρˆv), E(ρˆu)) d→∞=
∞∑
k=1
e−EEk
√
1−
(
m−2wt(x)
m
)2k
k!
,
(18)
where E = m|α|2, and once again x = u⊕ v.
FIG. 4: A plot of R = D(E(ρˆu), E(ρˆv))/D(ρˆu, ρˆv) versus |α|
for m = 10 and d = 100 for various weights w = wt(u ⊕
v) values. The values of R are less than unity indicating a
suppression of distinguishability by the encryption operation.
For comparison, we compute the trace distance be-
tween the unencrypted states ρˆu and ρˆv which is equal
to that between the unencrypted states ρˆx and ρˆ0 for
x = u ⊕ v, because of the invariance of the trace dis-
tance under a unitary transformation. This trace dis-
tance can be expressed in terms of a rank matrix Qˆ :=
|ψx〉 〈ψx| + |ψ0〉 〈ψ0| − B |ψx〉 〈ψ0| − B |ψ0〉 〈ψx|, where
B := e−2wt(x)|α|
2
. Specifically
D(ρˆu, ρˆv) =
1
2
tr
(√
Qˆ
)
=
√
1−B2
=
√
1− e−4wt(x)|α|2 , (19)
where 1−B2 is the eigenvalue of Qˆ (see Appendix A for
derivation). The trace distances in eqs. 18 and 19 are
plotted for strings of length m = 10 in Figures 2 and 3
respectively. Figure 2 was calculated using an encryption
key with d = 100.
The qualitative behaviours of the trace distances with
and without encryption are quite similar, with the trace
distance vanishing as |α| → 0, while approaching its
maximum value of unity as |α| grows. However, quan-
titatively, the trace distances are suppressed for the en-
crypted states (see Figure 4) and have a lower spread
over the different wt(x) values. The encryption would
make it harder for an adversary to distinguish between
the different encoded states, thus providing some modest
security.
6Let R := D(E(ρˆu), E(ρˆv))/D(ρˆu, ρˆv), and E := m|α|2.
We plot R versus m for (i) E = 1.0, and (ii) E = mr,
where r = 0.3 in Fig. 5. The ratios are less than unity
indicating that the trace distances are suppressed for the
encrypted states. However, as the ratios increase with
m, this suppression diminishes with an increasing length
of the encoded string in both energy regimes.
FIG. 5: A plot of R versus m with fixed wt(x) = 1 strings,
where x = u ⊕ v, and d = 100 for (i) E = 1.0, and (ii)
E = mr, where r = 0.3.
The corresponding lower bounds on I(x;yPGM) are
plotted in Fig. 6. It shows I(x;yPGM) increasing with
m for both (i) E = 1.0, and E = mr where r = 0.3. This
means that in these regimes of E, someone with the se-
cret key can send more information with increasing code
length.
FIG. 6: A plot of I(x;yPGM) versus m with d = 100, and
fixed wt(x) = 1 strings for (i) E = 1.0 and (ii) E = mr,
where r = 0.3.
One might hope for an energy regime in which
I(x;yPGM) increases, while the ratio R vanishes with in-
creasing m. However, this does not seem to be possible.
Our scheme is still useful in situations where secure del-
egated quantum processing is desired when constrained
to preparing simple resources like coherent states, and to
short codewords.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme that allows processing on logical qubits en-
coded onto coherent states while encrypted by a ran-
dom rotation in phase-space. Although the input states
are classical, the set of allowed quantum operations is
hard to simulate classically. We analyzed the security
of our scheme through the trace distance of any two en-
crypted codewords and showed that there exists regimes
of coherent-state amplitudes and bit-string length in
which the trace distance can be suppressed indicating in-
creased security afforded by the encryption. Our scheme
is readily implementable with existing optical network
technology, and is useful as a new primitive for secure
delegated quantum computing using continuous-variable
resources.
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Appendix A: Calculation of eigenvalues
Let |x〉 and |y〉 be normalized states that are not or-
thogonal to one another. Let |z〉 be a normalized state
that is orthogonal to |x〉 and in the plane spanned by |x〉
and |y〉. One can write |y〉 in terms of |x〉 and |z〉 as
|y〉 = (|x〉〈x|+ |z〉〈z|)|y〉
= |x〉 cos θ + |z〉 sin θ , (A1)
where cos θ = 〈x|y〉 and sin θ = 〈z|y〉. Then a given
matrix
M = |x〉〈x| − C|x〉〈y| − C|y〉〈x|+ |y〉〈y|. (A2)
can be rewritten in terms of |x〉 and |z〉 as
M =|x〉〈x|(1− 2C cos θ + cos2 θ)
+ |x〉〈z|(−C sin θ + sin θ cos θ)
+ |z〉〈x|(−C sin θ + sin θ cos θ)
+ |z〉〈z| sin2 θ, (A3)
8for which its eigenvalues are λ± = (1± C)(1∓ cos θ).
When M = Oˆk, C = Ak and cos θ = 〈g˜k|h˜k〉 = Ak, we
have λ+ = λ− = 1 − A2k. When M = Qˆ, C = B and
cos θ = 〈ψx|ψ0〉 = B, we have λ+ = λ− = 1−B2.
Appendix B: Calculation of qk and Ak in the limit
d→∞
In the limit d→∞, we can drop the modulus in φ(z)
and use the multinomial theorem to simplify qk and Ak.
We have
qk
d→∞
=
∑
z∈Nm
z1+...+zm=k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2(z1+...+zm)
z1!z2! . . . zm!
=
∑
z∈Nm
z1+...+zm=k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2k
k!
(
k
z1!z2! . . . zm!
)
=e−m|α|
2 (m|α|2)k
k!
, (B1)
where
(
k
z1,z2,...,zm
)
:= k!z1!z2!...zm! is the multinomial coef-
ficient and
Ak
d→∞
=
1
qk
∑
z∈Nm
z1+...+zm=k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2(z1+...+zm)
z1! . . . zm!
(−1)x·z
=
1
qk
∑
z∈Nm
z1+...+zm=k
e−m|α|
2 |α|2k
k!
(
k
z1, z2, . . . , zm
)
(−1)x·z
=
1
qk
e−m|α|
2 |α|2k
k!
((−1)x1 + . . .+ (−1)xm)k
=
1
qk
(m− 2wt(x))ke−m|α|2 |α|
2k
k!
, (B2)
respectively, where wt(x) is the Hamming weight of x.
